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[Crim. No. 5910. In Bank. June 21,1957.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THOMAS CARTER,
Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Consent-Br Wife.-When the 11811&1
amicable relations exist between husband and wife and property seized during his absence from the home is of a kind
over which she normally exercises as much control as he, it is
reasonable to conclude that she is in a position to consent to
a search and seizure in their home, and if she freely consents
to a removal of his property there is no unreasonahle Be&l'Ch
or seizure.
[2] ld.-Consent-Burden of Proof.-The prosecution has the
burden of proving consent of defendant's wife to a search and
seizure of his property during his absence.
[3] ld.-Waiver of Objections.-Defendant waived any objections
he may have had to a seizure of a letter written by him
and given to his wife to mail, when he introduced the letter at
the trial.
[4] ld.-Consent-By Wife.-Where evidence supports the trial
court's conclusion that defendant's wife freely consented to
police officers' entering their living room to question her about
defendant's activities, the evidence they gained from their conversation and observation is admissible.
[6] ld.-Consent-Br Wife.-In a prosecution for first degree
murder, evidence that defendant's wife freely cooperated with
police officers on a visit to their home, produced defendant's
trousers when she was requested to do so, and consented to
the subsequent taking of his shirt, allegedly worn at the time
of the crime, supported the trial court's conclusion that she
consented to an officer's taking the trousers when he returned
for them.
[6] Criminal Law-Compelling Production of Evidence.-On defendant's motion in a first degree murder case to compel the
district attorney to turn over to defendant's criminologist all
[1] Authority to consent for another to search or seizure, note,
31 A.L.R.2d 1078. See also Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2
et seq.; Am.Jur., Searches and Seizures, §§ 71, 72.
MeR. Dig. References: [1-5] Searches and Seizures, §1; [6,14]
Criminal Law, § 271; [7] Criminal Law, § 375; [8] Criminal Law,
§287; [9] Criminal Law, §416; [10] Criminal Law, §556; [11,12]
Criminal Law, § 524; [13] Criminal Law, § 416; [l5] Criminal
Law, § 272; [16-19] C.riminal Law, § 286: [20] Criminal Law,
§277; [21] Criminal, Law, §291: [22] Homicide, §175; [23] Homicide, § 174: [24] Criminal Law, § 888.
ca c:.Jd-.4t
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physieal evidenee taken from the tavern where the deceased
was found unconscious, all photographs made there, aud the
findings of the prosecution's criminologist based on his examition of the premises, no order of court was necessary, where
the district attorney voluntarily produced all that defendant
requested.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Facts Subsequent to Offense-Attempted Suicide.-Where the prosecution in a murder case relied on defendant's attempted suicide upon being summoned to the poliee
station as evidence of a guilty mind and thus as indireet
evidence that he had administered the beating to the deceased,
who was found unconscious in a tavern, it was error to exclude
testimony by a physician that immediately after defendant
attempted suicide he was rushed to the hospital in a critical
condition, that defendant thought he would die and that to
clear his conscience he stated he had passed some bad checks
but made no mention of the tavern or the deceased, since such
testimony provided an explanation for the suicide other than
that offered by the prosecution; such testimony would be
cumulative in the sense that it was identical in subject matter
with testimony defendant gave on the stand and in a statement to the district attorney, but not cumulative in respect
to its evidentiary weight.
[8] Id.-Rebuttal Evidence.-In a prosecution for first degree
murder, it was error to exclude the testimony of defendant's
minister that defendant told him the same story as he told
on the stand, namely, that he left the tavern where the crime
was committed, then returned and found the deceased lying
on the fioor, and in turning him over got blood on his clothes,
where at the time he told this story to his minister he did not
know that the blood on his clothes had been analyzed as the
deceased's type or that hairs similar to the deceased's had
been found on his trousers, since defendant had a right to
introduce this testimony to rebut the prosecution's charge that
his story was a recent fabrication.
[9] ld. - Evidence - Experiments. - Generally, the requirement
making the admission of experimental evidence depend on
whether the experiment was conducted under circumstances
substantially similar with those existing at the time and plaee
of the event in issue is imposed only when ii is claimed that
the results of the experiment are directly relevant to some
issue in the case.
[10] ld.-Evidence-Opinions of Experts-QnaJUications.-In a
prosecution for first degree murder, evidence that a criminologist made certain experiments in blood dynamics, namely,
that he had bea~en various bloody objects with instruments
of different shapes in order to grasp the relationship between
blood spots and their causes, was properly admitted to qualify
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him as an expert in blood dynamics, to show that by training
and experience he was able from an analysis of the size and
shape of blood spots to determine their source with some degree of accuracy, and to enable the jury to test the reliability
of his opinions by revealing their foundation.
[l1] ld.-Evidence - Documentary Evidence - Photographs.-If
the principl!l effect of photographs of a murder victim is to
arouse the passions of the jury and inflame them against defendant because of the horror of the crime, the evidence must
be excluded, but if the ev,idence has probative value with respect to a fact in issue th'lt outweighs the danger of prejudice
to defendant, the evidence: is admissible even if it is gruesome
and may incidentally arouse the passions of the jury; the matter is primarily for the determination of the trial court in
the exercise of its discretion.
[12] ld.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photographs.-!n a
prosecution for first degree murder, where a crucial question
was whether the deceased's wounds were caused by a flexhandle wrench found in a slough near defendant's home and
certain colored slides of the deceased taken at the time of the
autopsy graphically showed the nuture of these wounds, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the slides
in evidence as a basis for testimony by the autopsy surgeon
that the wounds could have been caused by the wrench and
that certain irregularities in the wounds could correspond to
an irregularity in the wrench, particularly where the court
carefully warned the jury against allowing the slides to prejudice them against defendant.
[IS] ld.-Evidence-Experiments-Lie Detector Tests.-Lie detector tests do not have enough reliability to justify the admission of expert testimony based on their results; and a suspect's willingness or unwillingness to take such a test is likewise without enough probntive value to justify its admission.
[14] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-A defendant in a
criminal case can compel the production of a document when
it becomes clear during the course of a trial that the prosecu·
tion has in its possession relevant and material e,idence that
is not confidential, because the state has no interE'st in denying
the accused access to all· evidence that can throw light on
issues in the ease.
[15] ld-Inspection of Papers.-A defendant has the right to see
a transcript which the prosecution uses to impeach defendant's
witness and which defendant seeks to in~pect for the purpose
of rehrthilitntion: the witness' memory of what he said is not
enough.

[11] See Cal.Jur.2tl; Evidpnc(', § 22G et seq.: Am.Jur., Kddence.
§ 727 et seq.
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(16J Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-The
purpose of Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. 4, restricting the use of,
evidence in chief on rebuttal, is to assure an orderly presentation of evidence so that the trier of fact will not be confused.
to prevent a party from unduly magnifying certain evidence!
by dramatically introducing it late in the trial, and to avoid!
any unfair surprise that may result when a party who thinks \
he has met his opponent's case is suddenly confronted at the
end of the trial with an additional piece of crucial evidence. I
[17] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-Proper:
rebuttal evidence does not include a material part of the case i,
in the prosecution's possession that tends to establish defend- !
ant's commission of the crime; it is restricted to evidence made
necessary by defendant's case in the sense that he has introduced new evidence or made assertions that were not implicit
in his denial of guilt.
[18] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-A defendant's reiterated denial of guilt and the principal facts
that purportedly establish it does not justify the prosecution's
introduction of new evidence to establish that which defendant
would clearly have denied from the start.
119] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-In a
prosecution for first degree murder, it was improper to allow
the prosecution to introduce in evidence on rebuttal a red cap
similar to one worn by defendant and found in a slough near
defendant's home, where defendant's plea made it clear that
he would not admit having gone to the slough, his denial on the
stand furnished no new matter for rebuttal, and the cap should
have been presented by the prosecution as part of its case in
chief.
:20J Id.-Order of Proof.-Changes in the order of proof called
for by Pen. Code, § 1093, can be made within the sound discretion of the trial court.
:21] ld.-Reopening Case for Further Testimony.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reopen the case to
introduce evidence that a red cap, similar to one found in 8
slough near defendant's home (admitted in evidence) and to
one owned hy defendant, was found on a street corner on the
route defendant had taken from the scene of the murder to
his home, where the prosecution relied heavily on the fact that
a red cap similar to one worn by defendant had been found
with a wrench and the deceased's wallet in the slough; and
the faet that a red cap found in the evidence room of the
sheriff's office could not be immediately identified as the cap
found on the street corner was no reason to deny defendant's
motion.

I
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[22] Homicide-Imtructions.-In a prosecution for first degree
muruer, the court diel not err in failing to in3truct on the
distinction between robbery and burglary, as against the assertion that the jury knew defendant had been convicted of burglary in another state and might have thought that burglary
like robbery involved violence against the person of another,
where the court carefully instructed the jury that it could
take defenuant's prior conviction into account only in assessing
his credibility; on the issue of credibility it was irrelevant
whether or not defendant's prior conviction had been a crime
of violence.
[23] Id.-Instructions.-In a prosecution for first degree murder,
the court did not err in failing to instruct that the homicide
was not in the perpetration of robbery if the intent to rob
arose after the attack on the deceased, where at no time during
trial did defendant eon tend that he thought of robbing the
deceased only after attacking him, but, on the contrary, denied
either attacking or robbing him.
[24] Criminal Law-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-In a
case which rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, it is error
to refuse an instruction that each fact which is essential to
complete a chain of circumstances that will establish defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

)

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte
County and from an order denying a new trial. J. F. Good,
Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. JUdgment of first degree murder
imposing the death penalty, reversed.
Robert K. Stone, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
Laughlin & McKalson and Robert E. Laughlin for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and
J. M. Sanderson, Deputy Attorneys General, and C. Keith
Lyde, District Attorney (Butte) for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree and the jury imposed the death pena1ty. A
motion for a new trial was denied. This appeal is automatic.
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
On September 29; 1955, about 3 :35 p. m., Frank Carey,
owner of the Log' Cabin Bar near Chico, was found uncon-
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acious on the floor of the card room of his bar, his head
bloody and bruised. He never regained consciousness and
died several hours later as a result of his injuries.
Defendant was in the bar from the time Carey opened
it about 12 :30 p. m. until shortly after 3 p. m., drinking beer,
playing the pinball machine, and talking with other customers.
Witnesses testified that he was wearing khaki trousers, a dark
jacket, and a cap with a pushed-up bill. His grey Dodge
pickup truck was parked out in front. The last person to see
him in the bar was a salesman who arrived about 3 p. m. and
stayed about five minutes. He spoke briefly with Carey and
defendant. Carey told him that business had been good that
week and that he was holding a 20-dollar bet on the World
Series. About 3 :35 p. m., Carey's accountant entered the bar
and found Carey unconscious. A no-sale sign was rung up on
the cash register, and there was no currency in the drawer.
At about 3 :25 p. m. a grey pickup similar to defendant's
cut in front of a school bus on the highway near defendant's
house, causing the bus driver to stop suddenly to avoid a
collision. The pickup entered the driveway of defendant's
house. At 4 p. m. defendant's landlord went to the house to
collect the rent, which was a month and a half in arrears.
Defendant appeared in dark, not khaki trousers. ne promised
to pay the rent soon.
Shortly after midnight, Deputy Sheriff Rushton confronted
defendant and his wife in a cocktail lounge in Chico and
informed defendant that the sheriff wanted to talk to him
at the police station. Defendant asked if he could take his
wife home first, and Rushton agreed. Defendant, his wife,
anu Rushton then drove to the Carter house in the pickup,
while another officer followed in a patrol car. As they entered
the house, defendant handed his wife a notebook, telling her
to mail the letter therein. While Rushton waited in the living
room. defendant looked in on his children in their beds.
He then went into the bathroom and closed the door. Thereafter Rushton heard the latch click and called to defendant
several times but got no response. When he heard something
fall to the floor, he broke down the bathroom door. He found
that defendant had slashed his arm with a razor and was
lying on the floor with blood spurting from an artery. Despite defendant's resistance Rushton managed to check the
flow of blood. He testified that defendant said to him after comIng out of a state of- shock, "You wouldn't tell me what you
wanted me for, but I knew"; that Rushton asked, "What
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did you think we wanted you forI" and that defendant did
not answer but "just laid back and grinned." Other police
officers arrived, an ambulance was summoned, and defendant
was removed to a hospital.
Early in November 1955, Carey's wallet, a llexhandle
wrench, and a red cap were found under a bridge at Edgar
Slough, about two-tenths of a mile from defendant's house.
There was no money in the wallet, although Carey was in the
habit of carrying substantial sums. One of defendant's
neighbors, E. E. Myers, testified that he had lent defendant a
set of tools that included a wrench of the same make and size
as the one found in Edgar Slough and that this wrench was
not among the tools shown to him by the police as those removed from defendant's truck.
Dr. Paul Kirk, a witness for the prosecution, testified that
he examined the card room of the Log Cabin shortly. after
the homicide, and found that the grease on the 1l00r was
identical with grease on the wrench discovered in Edgar
Slough. He also testified that there was blood on defendant's
shoes and the lower part of his khaki trousers, and that the
blood was type B, Carey's type. He further testified that he
found on the inside of the right rear pocket of the trousers
another blood stain and two hairs that had a "microscopic
identity" with hair taken from Carey's head. Finally, he
testified that one of 11 hairs found in the cap from Edgar
Slough was "morphologically indistinguishable" from onefifth of a sample of defendant's hair.
Defendant took the stand in his own behalf and denied that
he had either robbed or beaten Carey. His own account of
what he did on September 29th was substantially as follows:
He left the Log Cabin shortly after 3 p. m. intending to go
home, but after driving a short distance decided to return
and try his luck again at the pinball machine. When he
entered the bar and did not see Carey, he called several
times. Receiving no answer, he looked into the card room.
There he saw Carey lying on the floor with his face to the
wall, bleeding and breathing hard. He bent over the body
and rolled it towards him, und blood spattered on his trousers,
shoes, and hands. He reached for a handkerchief in his rear
pocket and must have stained it with blood.
Defendant testified. that he was terrified by these events and
by the realization·tbat many persons had seen him in the
bar and if police questioned him they would find out that he
had violated his parole from the Washington State Peni-
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tcntiary te wJ}ich he had been sentenced for burglary. He
therefore did not report his discovery to anyone but drove
straight home and laterehanged his trousers. In a statement
to the police on September 30th, however, he had denied any
knowledge that Carey had been beaten and stated that the
blood on his trousers must have been his own.
Defendant explained his attempted suicide by testifying
that he was short of money and owed a number of bills, that
he had passed several bnd checks, and that he was afraid
he would be sent back to prison as a parole violator. Moreover, he was generally despondent and had intended for some
time to kill himself. The notebook that defendant handed to
his wife before his attempted suicide contained a letter to
his uncle, written before the attack on Carey, declaring defendant's intention to kill himself.
Before trial defendant moved to suppress evidence allegedly
acquired by a search and seizure in violation of defendant's
constitutional rights. The motion was denied. During the
trial defendant unsuccessfully renewed his objection to the
use of some of this evidence. His objection compels examination of the circumstances under which the challenged evidence
was obtained.
After defendant attempted to kill himself and Deputy
Rushton broke into the bathroom, about half an hour elapsed
before defendant was removed in an ambulance. Mrs. Carter
testified that during that time she was confused by the numerous police coming in and out of the house and that her five
children were upset and crying over the commotion and the
sight of their father being carried out on a stretcher.
About 1 :15 a. m., some 15 minutes after defendant had
been carried out and all the police had left, Deputy Arbuckle
returned to the house. He testified that "The sheriff told me
to go back and get the letter Mr. Carter mentioned." When
Mrs. Carter answered the door, he told her that "the sheriff
wanted me to come back and get the letter," or, according to
Mrs. Carter, "he had to see the letter." She handed over
the notebook containing the letter, and although she asked if
she could keep the notebook itself, Arbuckle stated that it
would be better if he took the letter and the whole notebook.
While Deputy Arbuckle was still in the house, two more
officers appeared and questioned Mrs. Carter about the clothes
defendant had been wearing during the day. They testified
that they asked Mrs. parter if they could see defendant'8
trousers, and that sne got them from another room. Kra.
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Carter testified that it was the officers themselves who got the
trousers. After examining the trousers, the officers left them
on the ironing board and departed.
Around 2 :15 a. m. Deputy Arbuckle returned to the house
again and told Mrs. Carter, "the Sheriff wanted me to bring
those trousers up," or, according to Mrs. Carter, "that they
would have to have the trousers." Mrs. Carter said nothing
and stepped aside; Arbuckle went in, took the trousers from
the ironing board, and departed. Arbuckle did not inform
Mrs. Carter that she could refuse to turn the trousers over
to him, and she testified that she did not know she could
refuse. She also testified that the police would not tell her
why they were investigating her husband.
Still later, Arbuckle and Rushton returned once again, and,
according to their testimony, asked Mrs. Carter if they could
have the shirt, or "informed [Mrs. Carter that they] ... came
after the shirt..•. " They testified that this time they told
her she could refuse. She said that the children were upset
and she would prefer not to be disturbed again until morning,
but the officers said that if they could have the shirt they
would not bother her again. Mrs. Carter said all right, if
this would be the last time, and Rushton went in and took
the shirt from the bathroom.
About 8 a. m. more officers appeared at the house, examined
defendant's pickup truck, which was parked either in the
driveway or in front of the house, and made a list of the tools
in it. They either told Mrs. Carter they were taking the
truck away or asked and received her permission to take it
away. It is admitted that at no time during these visits to
defendant's house did the police have a warrant or was defendant under arrest.
The prosecution contends that the consent of defendant's
wife justified the seizure of his property. The effect of a
wife's consent to the search or seizure of her husband's property is the subject of sharp disagreement in other jurisdictions. (See e.g., United States v. Heine (2d Cir.), 149 F.2d
485, 488, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 [65 S.Ot. 1578, 89 L.Ed.
2000]; United States v. Sergio (E.D.N.Y.), 21 F. Supp. 553,
554; Ellis v. State, 130 Tex.Crim. 220 [93 S.W.2d 438, 439440] ; Cass v. State, 124 Tex.Crim. 208 [61 S.W.2d 500, 501503] ; but see e.g., Cofer v. United States (5th Cir.), 37 F.2d
677,679; Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626 [105 N.E.2d 509, 511512, 31 A.L.R.2d 1071] ; Simmons v. State, 94 Okla.9rim. 18
[229 P.2d 615, 618]; Almot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078, 1080-1081,
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1091.) The problem ca11s for a determination of whether the
wife's relation to her husband and his property is such that
there is no invasion of his privacy if she consents.
[1] When the husband is absent from the home, it is the
wife who controls the premises, the ordinary household prop- .
erty, the family automobile, and with her husband's tacit
consent determines who sha11 and who shall not enter the
house on business or pleasure and what property they may
take away with them. (Cf. People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal.
App.2d 63, 65 [300 P.2d 194].) When the usual amicable
relations exist between husband and wife (cf. Kelley v. State,
184 Tenn. 143 [197 S.W.2d 545, 546]), and the property
seized is of a kind over which the wife normally exercises
as much control as the husband, it is reasonable to conclude
that she is in a position to consent to a search and seizure
of property in their home. If Mrs. Carter freely consented
to the removal of defendant's property, there was no unreasonable search or seizure. (Peop~e v. Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 49
[301 P.2d 241] ; People v. Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 782-783 [291
P.2d 469] ; People v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 761 [290 P.2d
855] ; People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751, 753-754 [290 P.2d
852] ; People v. Wilson, 145 Cal.App.2d 1, 7 [301 P.2d 974] ;
see Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 [41· S.Ct. 266, 65
L.Ed. 654].) [2] The burden of proving such consent was
on the prosecution. (Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 269,
272 [294 P.2d 23].)
No question arises as to the seizure of the notebook and
letter by Deputy Arbuckle on his 1 :15 a. m. visit. [3] The
evidence in the letter was favorable to defendant, and by introducing it at the trial himself, he has waived whatever objections he may have had. [4] As to the second visit by
Officers Parker and Evans, the evidence supports the conclusion that Mrs. Carter freely consented to their entering
the living room to question her about defendant's activities.
(See People v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 754 [290 P.2d 852].)
What evidence they gained from their conversation and observation was therefore admissible. [5] Moreover, the evidence
that Mrs. Carter freely cooperated with the officers on this
visit, produced the trousers when she was requested to do so,
and consented to the subsequent taking of the shirt, supports
the trial court's conclusion that she also consented to Deputy
Arbuckle's taking the trousers when he returned for them.
The state of the record makes it impossible for us to
determine whether the evidence gained from the search of

)
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defendant's truck was properly admitted. At the hearing
before trial on the motion to suppress, the only evidence introduced on this question was Mrs. Oarter's testimony that an
officer had come to the door and told her that they were taking
the truck away, and that she had not said that it would be
all right. If her testimony was true, there was no consent.
At the trial, before another judge than the one who had ruled
on the motion to suppress, the sheriff testified tbat he had
asked for and reeeived permission from Mrs. Oarter to remove
the truck. If his testimony was true, there was enough evidence to support a finding of consent. The record indicates,
however, that in overruling defendant's motion to exclude the
evidence, the trial court did not consider Mrs. Carter's testimony in support of the earlier motion, which flatly contradicted the sheriff's testimony. It failed to do so apparently
on the ground that it was unnecessary to reconsider a matter
already considered by another judge. It indicated that defendant would not be permitted to introduce evidence considered on the earlier motion. On retrial it will be possible for
the court, if evidence obtained from the truck is introduced
again, to consider all the evidence bearing on the question of
Mrs. Oarter's consent to the search of the truck and determine
whether she or the sheriff is to be believed.
Defendant next contends that the prosecution deliberately
destroyed material physical evidence, implying that as a consequence defendant cannot ever be given a fair trial. In his
affidavit defense counsel alleges that he requested the district
attorney to allow defendant's criminologist to inspect the Log
Cabin; that the district attorney informed counsel that the
keys to the premises had been returned to the attorney for
Carey's executrix; that counsel discovered that the keys had
not in fact been returned to the attorney but must have still
heen in the possession of the prosecution. On January 6th.
defense counsel again asked the district attorney to permit
defendant's criminologist to inspect the premises. The district attorney replied tlwt an inspection would be permitted
on January 14th, but on January 13th he informed defem;e
eounsel that the premises had been cleaned up and returned
to the Oarey family.
If these allegations be true, the State may have disabled
itself from ever giving defendant a fair trial. Following the
incidents in January, however, defendant did not make any
such sweeping' (·laim ofprejudiee. [6] Instead. he m-oved the
court to compel the uistrict attorney to turn over to defend-

\
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ant's criminologist all physical evidence taken from the Log
Cabin, all photographs made there, and the findings of the
prosecution's criminologist based on his examination of the
premises. Defendant stated that unless his motion were
granted there could not be a fair trial. In fact no order
of court was necessary, for the district attorney voluntarily
produced all that defendant requested. Defendant's apparent
satisfaction was a concession that access to all that the prosecution had discovered was an adequate substitute for inspection of the premises by his own criminologist. Moreover, defendant does not contend that specific evidence was suppressed,
or that there is any likelihood that his criminologist would
have found evidence not unearthed by the prosecution's expert.
[7] Defendant next cites as error the exclusion of certain
evidence. The prosecution relied on defendant's attempted
suicide as evidence of a guilty mind, and thus as indirect
evidence that defendant had administered the beating to
Carey. To rebut this inference defendant sought to introduce
testimony by Dr. Locarnini that immediately after defendant
attempted suicide he was rushed to the hospital in a critical
condition; that the doctor thought he would die; that when
asked if he thought he would die defendant answered yes;
that he answered yes when arsked if he wanted to clear his
conscience and then stated that he had passed some bad
checks but made no mention of the Log Cabin or Carey.
It was error to exclude this testimony, for it provided an
explanation for defendant's attempted suicide other than that
offered by the prosecution. (See People v. Goodwin, 202 Cal.
527,540-541 [261 P. 1009] ; People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242, 246
[121 P. 922] ; Peop7e v. Anderson, 57 Cal.App. 721,727 [208
P. 204J ; 22 C.J.S. 965.) The testimony would not be merely
cumulative. True, defendant's testimony on the stand and
his statement to the district attorney, recorded and played
in court, apprised the jury of the reasons defendant gave
for his attempted suicide, and these were the same as he gave
when he was at the point of death. It does not follow, however, that Dr. Locarnini's testimony would be merely cumulative. Although cumulatiye in the sense that it was identieal
in subject matter with this other evidence. the testimony
was not cumulative in respect to its evidentiary weight. The
jury would be more 1Ill'lined to believe an explanation given
immediately after the attempted suieide, when dE'fendant
thought he was going to· aie. than the same ('x planation given
at a time when hope of life had returned and the opportunity

)
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for fabrication intervened. Defendant's suicide note to his
uncle before the attack on Carey was some evidence of motivation for his attempted suicide other than guilty knowledge of
the attack. Since the note was written before the attack,
however, it could not be so persuasive evidence as the statement to Dr. Locarnini. The note made no mention of the
bad checks or any other particular reason for suicide. The
reason for the exclusion of merely cumulative evidence, that
its slight probative value is 9utweighed by the disadvantage
of confusing the jury and obscuring the fundamental issues
(see 6 Wigmore, Evidence 576-578, 581-586 (3d ed. 1940»,
fails in the present case because the probative value of the
excluded testimony was greater than that of the other evidence introduced on the same issue.
[8] The court also erred in excluding the testimony of defendant's minister. Defendant offered the testimony of Reverend Crouch that on October 4th defendant told him the
same story as he told on the stand: that he had left the Log
Cabin, and then returned and found Carey lying on the floor
of the card room, and in turning him over got blood on his
clothes. At the time he told this story to Reverend Crouch,
defendant did not know that the blood on his clothes had
been analyzed as Carey's type or that hairs similar to Carey's
had been found on his trousers. Defendant had a right to
introduce this testimony to rebut the prosecution's charge
that his story was a recent fabrication. (See People v. Hardenbrook, ante, pp. 345, 351-352 [309 P.2d 424]; People
v. Walsh, 47 Cal.2d 36, 48 [301 P.2d 247] ; People v. Kynette,
15 Ca1.2d 731, 753-754 [104 P.2d 794], cert. denied, 312 U.S.
703 [61 8. Ct. 806, 85 L.Ed. 1136].) Again, this evidence
would not be merely cumulative. In the tape-recorded interview between defendant and the district attorney, introduced
in evidence, defendant did not give the explanation he gave
on the stand, but on the contrary disclaimed any knowledge
of the attack on Carey. This statement did not, therefore,
rebut the charge of recent fabrication but gave it additional
support. The statement to Reverend Crouch was the only
declaration by defendant that tended to rebut that charge and
should have been admitted.
Defendant next cites as error the admission of certain evidence. Dr. Kirk was permitted to testify that he had made
certain experiments. in blood dynamics: that he had beaten
various bloody objects with instruments of different shapes in
order to grasp the relationship between blood spots and their
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canses. Defendant contends that it was error to admit this
evidence because the experiments were not conducted under
circumstances substantially similar to those in the card room
of the Log Cabin when Carey was beaten. [9] It is true that
the conditions were not substantially similar, but generally this
requirement is imposed only when it is claimed that the results
of an experiment are directly relevant to some issue in the
case. (People v. Wagner, 29 Cal.App. 363, 367-370 [155 P.
649].) The prosecution made no attempt to show that because
certain spots were produced by a certain cause in the experiments, similar spots on defendant's clothes or the floor of the
card room must have been produced by a similar cause. In
fact, there was no evidence of the results of the experiments;
Dr. Kirk testified only that he had made them.
[10] Evidence that he had made the experiments was introduced to qualify him as an expert in blood dynamics, to show
that by training and experience he was able from an analysis of
the size and shape of blood spots to determine their source
with some degree of accuracy, and to enable the jury to test
the reliability of his opinions by revealing their foundation.
For these purposes the evidence was properly admitted.
(People v. Crooms, 66 Cal.App.2d 491, 496 [152 P.2d 533] ;
Hastings v. Serleto, 61 Cal.App.2d 672, 688-689 [143 P.2d
956].) It may be that when a specific experiment is the sole
basis for an expert opinion, it would be essential to an adequate foundation that the experiment be made under conditions substantially similar to those that existed under the
facts of the case, as it is essential to relevancy when the
results of an experiment are introduced as direct evidence on
an issue. The experiments in the present case, however, were
by no means the sole basis for Dr. Kirk's opinion. He testified to general experience and knowledge of chemistry and
physics, and of blood dynamics in particular. The experiments themselves were the last phase of work extending over
a number of years, and Dr. Kirk stated that his opinions did
not rest solely on their results.
From an analysis of the size and shape of blood spots in
the card room, Dr. Kirk gave his opinion as to what their
point of origin must have been. Then, from an analysis
of the blood spots on defendant's clothes, he stated that if
the blood was spattered on the clothes at the time Carey was
beaten, the person wearing them must have been not more than
two and one-half feet from the source of the blood. These
inferences required knowledge and experience beyond those
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of ordinary jurors and could assist them to weigh the evidence more perceptively than they could unaided. (People v.
Crooms, 66 Ca1.App.2d 491, 494-496 [152 P.2d 533]; see
People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d 99, 103-106 [301 P.2d 854] ; George
v. Bekim Van «; Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843-844 [205
P.2d 1037].)
[l1J Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence certain colored slides of Carey
taken at the time of the autopsy. The slides showed the deceased's head, face, and neck,and the wounds that had caused
his death, and were used by the autopsy surgeon as the basis
for his testimony. If the principal effect of demonstrative
evidence such as photographs is to arouse the passions of the
jury and inflame them against the defendant because of the
horror of the crime, the evidence must of course be excluded.
(People v. Oheary, ante, pp. 301, 311-312 [309 P.2d 431] I
People v. Oavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252, 266-268 [282 P.2d
53], cert. denied, 350 U.S. 950 [76 8.Ct. 325, 100 L.Ed. 828].)
On the other hand, if the evidence has probative value with
respect to a fact in issue that outweighs the danger of prejudice to the defendant, the evidence is admissible even if it is
gruesome and may incidentally arouse the passions of the jury.
(People v. Oheary, ante, pp. 301, 312 [309 P.2d 431].) It
is primarily for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion
to weigh the importance of putting before the jury all that
may reasonably assist them in the determination of guilt
against the danger that they will substitute emotion for reason
as the basis of their verdict.
[12J In the present case one of the crucial qUE'stions was
whether Carey's wounds were caused by the flex-handle wrench
found in Edgar Slough, and the colored slides graphically
showed the nature of these wounds. The autopsy surgeon used
the slides to point out that the wounds must have been inflicted
by an instrument that was hard, had smooth edges, and was
at least six inches in length, and -that the wounds could have
been caused by the wrench. He pointed also to certain irregularities in the wounds, stating that they could correspond to an
irregularity in the wrench, and that these irregularities were
probably more accurately depicted in the slides than in his
blackboard diagrams. In these circumstances the court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the slides in evidence,
particularly since'it carefully warned the jury against. allowing the slides to prejudice them against defendant.
[13] The court did commit error, however, in not excluding
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a statement by one Bennett, a man who had also been in the
Log Cabin and was an important suspect in the case, that
he had been willing to take a lie detector test. The court
ordered stricken his further testimony that, "and some other
people wouldn't take [such a test) •.•," but in view of the
testimony the court permitted to stand, the implication survived that defendant had refused to take a lie detector test and
that his refusal furnished some evidence of guilty knowledge.
Lie detector tests do not as yet have enough reliability to
justify the admission of expert testimony based on their
results. (People v. W ochnick, 98 Cal.App.2d 124, 126-128
[219 P.2d 70); People v. Porter, 99 Cal.App.2d 506, 510511 [222 P.2d 151).) It therefore follows that a suspect's
willingness or unWillingness to take such a test is likewise
without enough probative value to justify its admission. The
suspect may refuse to take the test, not because he fears that
it will reveal consciousness of guilt, but because it may record
as a lie what is in fact the truth. A guilty suspect, on the
other hand, may be willing to hazard the test in the hope that
it will erroneously record innocence, knowing that even if it
does not the results cannot be used as evidence against him.
Defendant next contends that it was error to deny
him the right to inspect a document used in thecross-examination of his wife. :Mrs. Carter stated on cross-examination
that she could not remember if defendant was wearing a red
cap when he left the house on the morning of September 29th.
The prosecutor then asked her if she remembered being interviewed by the sheriff on September 30th when a stenographer
was present, and read from the stenographer's transcript
questions put to :Mrs. Carter, and her answer that she believed
defendant had been wearing a cap. Defense counsel requested
and was denied the right to inspect the transcript.
[14] We have recently held that the defendant in a criminal case can compel production when it becomes clear during
the course of a trial that the prosecution has in its possession
relevant and material evidence that is not confidential, because "the state has no interest in denying the accused access
to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the rase .... "
(People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 586 [305 P.2d 1].) [15] We
were there concerned with the defendant's right to inspect
statements that he reasonably believed could be used to impeach the prosecution '.8 witnesses, but the reasons for the decision apply with equal force to a statement the prosecution has
used in impeaching the defendant's witness and that the de-
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fend ant now seeks to inspect for the purpose of rehabilitation.
The prosecutor may read to the jury extracts from the transcript selected with an eye to putting the witness in the
worst possible light by emphasizing the gap between his prior
statement and his present testimony. It is clearly unfair to
deny the defendant an opportunity to show that the extracts
have been taken out of context, and that when read with
other parts of the statement the alleged inconsistency disappears. To be effective such an opportunity must include
the right to see the transcript the prosecution has used; the
witness' memory of what he said is not enough. (See People
v. Stevenson, 103 Cal.App. 82, 88-92 [284 P. 487] ; Meadors v.
Oommonwealth, 281 Ky. 622 [136 S.W.2d 1066, 1068-1069] ;
6 Wigmore, Evidence 477 (3d ed. 1940).)
On rebuttal the prosecution was allowed to introduce in
evidence the red cap found in Edgar Slough. Defendant. contends that by withholding this important evidence instead of
presenting it as part of its case in chief, the prosecution
gained an unfair advantage over defendant. The prosecution
contends in reply that since defendant denied on the stand
that he had been to Edgar Slough or left the wallet or wrt'llch
there, the cap was properly admitted to rebut this testimony
or impeach defendant's credibility.
[16] Section 1093, subdivision 4, of the Penal Code provides that after the defendant has offered his evidence, the
prosecution may then offer "rebutting testimony only, unless
the court, for good reason, in furtherance of justice ... " permits it to offer evidence upon its original case. In a sense
all evidence that tends to establish the defendant's guilt over
his protestations of innocence rebuts the defendant's case, but
it is not all rebuttal evidence within the purpose of section
1093, subdivision 4. The purpose of the restriction in that
section is to assure an orderly presentation of evidence so that
the trier of fact will not be confused; to prevent a party
from unduly magnifying certain evidence by dramatically introducing it late in the trial; and to avoid any unfair surprise
that may result when a party who thinks he has met his
opponent's case is suddenly confronted at the end of trial
with an additional piece of crucial eyidence. [17] Thus
proper rebuttal evidcnce does not include a material part of the
case in the prosecution's possession that tends to establish the
defendant's commission of the crime. It is restricted to evidence made nec~ssary by the defendant's case in the senst'
that he has introduced new evidence or made assertions that
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were not implicit in his denial of guilt. (See Peop7c v. Bllril.
42 Ca1.2d 200, 211-212 [266 P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.s.
848 [75 S.Ct. 73, 99 L.Ed. 668] ; People v. Nyc, 38 Ca1.2d 34.
38-39 [237 P.2d 1] ; People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487, 491 [2]8
P.2d 527] ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence 510-511,516 (3d ed. 1940).)
[18] A defendant's reiterated denial of guilt and the principal facts that purportedly establish it docs not justify the prosecution's introduction of new evidence to establish that which
defendant would clearly have denied from the start.
[19] The red cap found in Edgar Slough was crucial
evidence tending to show that defendant had put the wallet
and wrench in the slough and therefore had beaten and
robbed Carey. Defendant's plea made it clear that he would
not admit having gone to the slough, and his denial on the
stand furnished no new matter for rebuttal. The evidence
should have been put in as part of the case in chief. (See
People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 418-419 [136 P.2d
626].)
[20] Changes in the order of proof called for by section
1093 can be made within the sound discretion of the trial
court. (Ct. People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d
527].) In the present case, however, the prosecution offers
no reason why the cap could not have been introduced in
chief, but since defendant did not make completely clear to
the trial court the objection that he now argues, we would not
be justified in finding that there has been an abuse of discretion. On the retrial of this case an order of proof will no
doubt be observed that is consonant with the purposes of
section 1093.
[21] Defendant next contends that the court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to reopen the case to introduce evidence that on the 11th of October a red cap, similar
to the one found in Edgar Slough and to the one owned by
defendant, had been found on the corner of Fifth Street and
Esplanade in Chico on the route defendant had taken from
the Log Cabin to his house.
The record is not altogether clear whether this was a motion
to reopen or a motion for a continuance. During the extended
discussion in chambers there were several references to a
possible continuance, but defendant's counsel early stated,
"Now I would have to request that I be permitted to reopen
to explore on surrebuttal the finding of this hat," and in
formally denying defendant's motion the court stated, "Under
the circumstanceS, I am denying the motion to reopen at this
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time. " It does not appear that for defendant's purposes a
continuance was essential. The important thing was to put
before the jury the fact that a second red cap, similar to
the one worn by defendant, had been found on the corner of
Fifth and Esplanade on October 11th. The district attorney
himself suggested that a stipulation of these facts could perhaps be worked out, and indeed they were not in dispute.
Even had a short continuance proved necessary to enable
defendant to put the facts before the jury, it should have
been granted.
The finding of the second cap was highly relevant; it might
even have become a decisive consideration in defendant's
favor. The trial court itself declared, upon the district attorney's argument that the finding of the second cap was irrelevant, "But one of the key circumstances in your case is a
red hat." The prosecution relied heavily on the fact that a
red cap similar to the one worn by defendant had been found
with the wrench and Carey's wallet in Edgar Slough in November. Had the jury known of the finding of the second
red cap, the probative value of the first might have been
sharply reduced.
During the discussion in chambers the sheriff produced a red cap found in the evidence room of his office. The
fact that this cap could not at that moment be conclusively
identified as the cap found on the corner of Fifth and Esplanade was no reason to deny defendant's motion. Defendant
had only to show that a red cap had been found, not to
produce any particular red cap. Moreover, any confusion
as to the identity of the cap was attributable to the sheriff's
office, not to defendant. After the red cap was found at
Fifth and Esplanade, it was sent to Dr. Kirk to be tested for
blood stains. He found none. The cap was then returned to
Deputy Longacre in the sheriff's office who presumably put
it in the evidence room. Soon after he retired from police
work. A few weeks before trial the cap could not be found,
but after a search of the evidence room a red cap was found;
it was this cap that the sheriff produced in chambers. The
district attorney suggested that it could be the one found at
Fifth and Esplanade, or that it could be another. The sheriff
could not recall that any third red cap had come into his
office. There was nothing to indicate that the cap produced
was not the original red cap.
The court was, hot justified in denying defendant ..
motion on the ground that his counsel knew about the &eCODd
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red cap before trial but took no steps to obtain it. Tbe extent
of counsel's knowledge appears from the following extracts
from the record:
"MR. STONE: But I must state to the Court that only this
morning did I discover-was I informed for the first time
that the sheriff's office of Butte County, between September
29 and the date of this trial-and I don't know the datefound or had turned in to them in Chico a red baseball cap,
one that is not in evidence, and that there has been no
showing-there bas been no reason for it whatsoever. It was
found, as I understand it, at 5th and tIle Esplanade, which
is between the Log Cabin and the defendant's residence on
the route which the defendant himsrlf says he took. I am
also informed that it is of the same type and description as
the one presently in evidence. In other words, it is red, it is
a baseball cap, and also that it is greasy"
And later in the discussion-"MR. STONE: Sometime back Mr. Carter in my discussion
with him stated to me that he had been questioned about a hat,
that there was no statement by Mr. Carter to me as to where
the hat was found, when it was found. He told me that be had
not been shown the hat. I had no way of knowing in view
of tbe fact tbat be bad told me there was no bat shown to
him as to whether or not this was simply an effort--.
"THE COURT: Was 5th and Esplanade mentioned?
"MR. STONE: Not to my recollection, no, Your Honor.
"MR. LYDE: I wonder if tbe Court would ask whetber or
not he mentioned a street.
"MR. STONE: I believe, as I recall, wbat Mr. Carter told
me, he said it was found uptown.
"MR. LYDE: Well, there, you see. We never told him we
found the one in the slough. At least I don't believe I did.
Bruce may bave. Go ahead, Mr. Stone.
"MR. STONE: But I would want to simply point out to the
Court that when Mr. Carter told me that he had not been
shown the hat that I thought this perhaps was simply an effort
in view of the statements made by Cox, which appeareci in
the newspaper, a statement by Beer-and I had talked to Beer
and Cox-and he had a bat on-I thougbt perhaps tbis was
an attempt to simply by tbe prosecution to endeavor to get a
confession out of the defendant and I put no weight on tbis
tbing at all. Now, you also recall, Your Honor, tbat-.
Well, I won't go any furtber. I have answered as best I can."
In some circumstances it migbt be proper to find that such
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information imposes on counsel the burden of pursuing every
evidentiary possibility on pain of being denied the right to
reopen for later discovered evidence. In the present case,
however, because of the closeness of the proof, the vital character of tbe evidence defendant sought to introduce, the
seriousness of tbe charge, and the absence of any substantial
considerations weighing against reopening the case, it was
.
clearly improper.
Neither defendant nor his counsel knew that a red cap
similar to defendant's had been found on the corner of Fifth
and Esplanade. The prosecution did not so advise them.
They bad only fragmentary information that some cap had
been mentioned by the police. Tbey would understandably
not appreciate tbe significance of this information if, as
seems likely, it came at a time antedating the discovery of
the red cap in the slough, when it had not yet become important for defendant to prove that thl' red cap in ihe slough
was not his cap.
Moreover, there were no substantial reasons against reopening the case. Defendant had only just rested, argument had
not begun and the jury had not been instructed, and it does
not appear that granting defendant's request would have entailed any great incom-enience. In a trial that had already
consumed 13 days, it was not unreasonable to request an
extension of a few hours to put before the jury evidence that
in justice should have been considered, as the trial court
itself must have recognized when it said in reference to
informing the jury of the finding of the second cap, "I don't
think I could deprive him [defendant] of that opportunity
and still give him a fair trial." Tbis decisive consideration
should have overcome arguments based on the notion that a
criminal trial is a rigorously adversary proceeding in which a
party must seize his opportunities when presented or forever
lose them.
People v. Buckowski, 37 Ca1.2d 629 [233 P.2d 912], and
People v. Fountain;170 Cal. 460 [150 P. 341], do not support
the trial court's ruling in the present ease. The defendants
in those eases had in their possession long before trial as
much information as the prosecution, and all that was necessary to enable them to obtain the evidence they wished. In
each case the defendant sought to postpone indefinitely the
beginning of t:rial rather than to reopen to admit specific
evidence already at hand. The materiality of the evidence
that each claimed could be found during a continuance was
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remote and speculative, whereas the evidence defendant sought
to introduce in the present case was relevant and material.
Finally, in the Buckowski ease, where the question was
whether the defendant had committed the homicide, the evidence against him was overwhelming, whereas in the present
case the evidence was such that additional evidence might well
have affected the result.
[22] Defendant's final objections go to the court's failure
to give certain instructions. Defendant contends that the
court should have instructed on the distinction between robbery and burglary, because the jury knew that defendant had
been convicted of burglary in another state and might have
thought that burglary like robbery involved violence against
the person of another. This argument implies that knowledge of defendant's conviction could directly affect the jury's
determination of guilt. The court carefully instructed the
jury, however, that it could take defendant's prior conviction
into account only in assessing his credibility, and there is
no reason to think that it did not obey this instruction. On
the issue of credibility, it was irrelevant whether or not defendant's prior conviction had been for a crime of violence.
[23] Nor was there error in the court's failure to instruct
that the homicide was not in the perpetration of a robbery if
the intent to rob arose after the attack on the deceased.
At no time during the trial did defendant rely on the theory
that such an instruction would have embodied. He did not
contend that he thought of robbing Carey only after attacking
him; on the contrary he denied either attacking or robbing
him. In each case that he invokes, People v. Hudson, 45 Cal.
2d 121, 124-126 [287 P.2d 497], and People v. Carnine, 41 Cal.
2d 384, 387-392 [260 P.2d 16], the defendant admitted killing
and robbing the victim and relied only on the defense that
the intent to rob had not been formed until after the homicide.
The court in the present case was not required to give an
instruction that would have had no foundation in the evidence
or in any theory on which the case was tried. (See People v.
Eggers, 30 CfA.2d 676, 687 [185 P.2d 1], cert. denied, 333
U.S. 858 [68 8.Ct. 728, 92 L.Ed. 1138].)
[24] The court refused to give an instruction that in a case
resting wholly on circumstantial evidence, "each fact which is
essential to complete a ellain of circumstances that will establish the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. " More, it positively informed the jury that thl' law
. was otherwise. In People v. Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 830-831
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[299 P.2d 243], we held that the refusal to give such an instruc1ion was error. A fortiori there was error here.
Defendant contends that still other errors were committed
by the court and that there was misconduct on the part of the
district attorney. Since the acts complained of are not likely
to attend a new trial, it is not necessary to consider them
here. On the basis of the errors eonsidered earlier it is clear
that defendant has not had a fair trial. The closeness of
the proof indicates that absent these errors the jury might
have reached a different verdict.
The judgment and order are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.

)

CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment or reversal and
generally in the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion.
I feel, however, that error also was committed in the admission
of Dr. Kirk's testimony concerning his experiments with the
pattern made by blood spattering from an object made of
wood, sponge rubber and a thin plastic sheet. The admission
of such testimony invaded the province of the jury as it was
based on conditions far removed from those actually existing
at the time the crime was committed. Such testimony from a
person as noted in criminology as Dr. Kirk could have had no
other effect than to impress and prejudice the jury particularly in a case as closely balanced as the one here under
consideration.
This court held in People v. W oon Tuck W0, 120 Cal. 294.
296-297 [52 P. 833], that unless such experiments are shown
to have been made under essentially the same conditions that
existed in the case on trial, the tendency is to confuse and
mislead rather than enlighten the jury. It most certainly
cannot be said that an object made of wood, sponge rubber
and a plastic sheet constituted the same thing as a human
bead. Further, as noted in tbe majority opinion, the prosecution made no attempt to show that because eertain spots
were produced by a certain cause in the experiments, similar
spots on defendant's trousers or on the floor or the card room
must have been produced by a similar cause. "Evidence of
tbis kind should be received with caution, and only be admitted
when it is obvious to the court from the nature of the experiments that the jury will be enlightened rather than confused.
In many circumstances a slight change in the conditions under
which the experiment is made will so distort the result as to
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wholly destroy its value as evidence, and make it harmful
rather than helpfuL" (People v. Wagner, 29 Cal.App. 363,
369-370 [155 P. 649] ; see also People v. Ely, 203 Cal. 628
[265 P. 818] ; People v. Parker, 4 Cal.App.2d 421, 424 [40
P.2d 836] ; McGough v. Hendrickson, 58 CatApp.2d 60 [136
P.2d 110].)
Defendant's story was that the spots on his clothing were
due to blood spraying on him as he handled the deceased's
body when he discovered it after the beating. Dr. Kirk's
testimony was to the effect that the blood could not have gotten
on defendant in that manner but could have gotten there only
if he had administered the beating. It was the jury's
prerogative to draw its own cOitclusion from the evidence without expert testimony based on totally dissimilar facts.
For this reason, as well as those stated in the majority
opinion, I concur in the reversal of the judgment.

I

Schauer, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree with
certain portions of the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor, but I disagree with other portions and dissent from the
conclusion that the judgment and order denying a new trial
should be reversed.
.
More specifically, I agree with those portions which declare
certain of defendant's claims of error to be without merit.
On the other hand, I cannot agree with certain portions of
the discussion which sustain some of defendant's claims of
prejudicial error. It would serY{' nO useful purpose, however,
to enter into a discussion of each of the several claims, hut a
reference to one such claim appears appropriate.
One of defendant's principal claims of prejudicial error
rests upon the failure of the trial court to give defendant's
requested instruction to the effect that in a case resting wholly
upon circumstantial evidence, "each fact which is essential
to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the
defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
This refusal is declared by Mr. Justice Traynor to constitute
prejudicial error. I cannot agree.
This court held in People v. Watso?!, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 830831 [299 P.2d 243], that the requested instruction was a proper
instruction, but that in the light of the instructions given,
there was no prejudicial error in the failure to give it. The
same is true here. The trial court gave numerous instructions
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in this general field including CALJIC 21, 24, 25 and 26.
Additionally, the trial court specifically instructed: "Before
the jury may find a defendant guilty, the law requires that
all of the esseI}tial elements of the crime charged, and each
fact necessary to establish the commission of the crime by
the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a moral certainty." The quoted instruction embodies the
principle found in defendant's requested instruction, and the
subject was therefore adequately covered.
Furthermore, I find nothing in the record to justify the
statement that the trial court "positively informed the jury
that the law was otherwise." During a colloquy between
court and counsel on the voir dire examination of the jurors,
and relating to an objection to a lengthy question on another
point, the trial court did make a statement that "Each circumstance does not require proof to a moral certainty and
beyond a reasonable doubt." Counsel for defendant' immediately said: "That wasn't my point. That was not the
point. Perhaps I can state it in another way." The trial
court then said: "I could not have answered the question
yes or no without numerous other factors to be considered."
Counsel for defendant then reframed his lengthy question, and
the reframed question was answered without objection.
In my opinion, the trial court's statement was correct and
in any event, it could not have been reasonably construed as
contrary to the trial court's formal instructions on the subject
under discm'lsion. It has never been held that "each circumstance," as distinguished from "each fact which is essential
to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the
defendant's guilt" (as stated in the requested instruction) or
"each fact necessary to establish the commission of the crime
by the defendane' (as stated in the given instruction) must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Certain facts or circumstances may appear in a lengthy record, which facts
and circumstances may not be essential to the determination
of the guilt of a dt'fendant; but it is only the" essential" or
"necessary" facts in the chain of circumstances which must
be proved by the quantum of proof required to sustain a
criminal convirtion. As above indicated, the trial court did
instruct the jury that "each fact neressary to establish the
commission of tIle crime by the defendant must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty." I therefore find no prejl1ijicial error in the failure to give the
requested instruction.
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It may be aRsumed that in the lengthy record covering
more than 1,700 pages, some error may be found. A readin~
of that record convinces me, howe"er, that the evidence presented a chain of circumstances so tightly linked about defendant that there is not the slightest doubt conceruing defendant's guilt of the cold-blooded murder of his 77-year-old
victim in the perpetration of robbery. I find no error of such
nature as to sustain a ('laim that there was any likelihood that
a result more favorable t.o defendant would have been reached
in the ev~nt that such error had not occurred. Under these
circumstances, I believe that this is a typical case for the
application of the constitutional mandate, which provides that
no reversal shall be ol'dered "unless, after an examination of
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
mi!;~arriage of justice."
(Const., art. VI, § 4%; People v.
Watson, supra, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 837-838.)
I would affirm the judgment of conviction and the order
denying a new trial.

Shenk, J., and McComb, J., eoncurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was t1enied July 16,
1957. Shenk, J., Spence, .J., and McComb, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

